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Abstract  
The relocation of the wool market from London to the major Australian port cities from the 
late nineteenth century required the formation of an institution to govern the auction business, 
namely the woolbrokers’ association.  Regional variations, among Sydney, Melbourne and 
Brisbane, occurred in the structure and effectiveness of the institution despite each regional 
association having been formed around the same time, for the same purpose, and with an 
overlap of participating firms.  We draw on institution theory to guide our account and find 
that the impact of legacy factors and differences in market conditions explain the regional 
variations. 
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The global supply chain in the world’s woollen textile industry underwent two significant 
changes in the second half of the nineteenth century. Raw wool came increasingly from the 
southern hemisphere where Australia emerged as the world’s foremost producer of apparel 
wool. Then between 1890 and 1910 the point of sale for most Australian wool shifted from 
London to auctions conducted across the main Australian port cities prior to export. Our 
study concerns the critical role of a new regionally-based institution, the wool brokers’ 
association, in this process.  
A critical element has been overlooked in earlier explanations of the transfer of the wool 
market to Australian cities1, the creation of an effective institutional framework to support the 
marketing of wool. This paper focuses on the three principal auction markets, of Sydney, 
Melbourne and Brisbane, which sold more than 70 per cent of Australia’s wool from the early 
‘nineties until 1909.2 Within each selling centre a number of firms, which simultaneously had 
competed to provide other types of services to wool growers, now formed associations in the 
1890s whose objectives were to conduct sales through a single auction room, to charge a 
common fee, and to restrict non-price competition for custom. 3  A study of these events 
permits us to observe the creation of an industry-specific institution, the woolbrokers’ 
association, at roughly the same time but in different geographic settings. Rich archival 
records enable us to explore the motivation for the establishment of the associations and to 
observe the interplay between the resulting organisations and their members. We discover 
variations in this institution and its effectiveness from city to city. We argue that participation 
in, and commitment to, each of the three institutional forms was dependent on localized 
external forces. The study is further nuanced, as each regional institution responded to the 
structure and performance of the others. Over time, the nature of coordination between them 
became as pressing as the need for coordination within each one.  Our story ends in 1909 
when the association in Sydney, which had collapsed in 1900, resumes and as the three 
associations begin discussions to establish a national body, a feat accomplished in 1918 with 
                                                          
1  Barnard, Australian Wool Market; Ville, Relocation of international wool market, pp.73-
95. 
2  Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Statistical Handbook, p. 36. Adelaide was also a major 
wool auction centre but lost ground to the other three in this period and fell behind Brisbane 
before World War One. 
3 Merrett and Ville. Industry associations and non-competitive behavior, pp. 510-28. 
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the formation of the Federated Wool Selling Brokers of Australia, the precursor to the 
National Council of Wool Selling Brokers of Australia a year later.4 
The paper begins by arguing that the growth of sales in the local wool market was contingent 
on having an effective institutional framework. We then draw on an element of institution 
theory5 to argue that the wool brokers’ associations were a form of institution, and one 
situated towards the regulatory end of a regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
continuum as described by Scott.6 Insights from institution theory frame the questions driving 
the paper, sharpen our thinking about concepts, and offer prompts about how we interpret our 
data.   
In the third section of the paper we use the archival records of the three associations to track 
their emergence and evolution. We find that all were initially designed as regulatory 
institutions that sought to garner cooperative behaviour among rival firms through a formal 
set of rules with extensive monitoring mechanisms and punishments for non-compliance. 
However, each adopted different sets of rules. We show how differences in the constitutional 
framework of each association reveal the extent of the struggle to achieve compliance and 
cooperation. Moreover, we find marked dissimilarities in these outcomes between 
associations. Cooperative impulses were far stronger in Melbourne and Brisbane than in 
Sydney where that association proved less effective in constraining the behaviour of member 
firms.  
The fourth section explores the reasons for the divergence in institutional form and the wide 
gap in its effectiveness between cities. We shift focus to the challenges facing firms operating 
within each of the three market places. The structure of the local ‘industries’, particularly the 
number and type of participating firms, and the supply of wool available for sale play a key 
part in our explanation of the differences. 
We conclude by observing that both weak and strong institutional forms were capable of 
underpinning the operation of the central auction system. A coordinated series of wool sales 
operated in Sydney despite low levels of trust between association members throughout the 
1890s and throughout the Association’s period of inactivity after 1900. Moreover, the Sydney 
                                                          
4 George L Aitken, Presidential Address, National Council of Wool Selling Brokers of 
Australia, 17 August 1921, 106/121, 5/1, Box 24, University of Melbourne Archive (hereafter 
UMA). 
5 For an overview of the field see Greenwood, et. al., SAGE Handbook. 
6  Scott, Institutions and Organizations. 
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wool sales were increasingly coordinated with those in Melbourne and Brisbane. We return to 
the institution theory literature to provide an explanation of this phenomenon. 
 
REQUIRING A NEW INSTITUTION 
Prior to the creation of a central auction system in the early 1890s, Australian wool had 
reached world markets in a variety of ways. For the most part, local stock and station agents 
and banks provided consignment services to grower clients. At the margin, some firms acted 
as merchants buying wool directly from growers and/or at auction in Sydney and 
Melbourne.7 
An initially fragmented Australian auction system was not an effective substitute in the eyes 
of foreign buyers to the dominant practice of consignment to auction in London up to the 
1880s for a number of reasons. Buyers coming to Australia faced higher costs in collecting 
information about multiple auction service providers, each with small offerings, who ran 
conflicting sales schedules, operated with different levels of charges, had idiosyncratic 
sampling procedures, and who had non-standard sales contracts and arbitration procedures. 
Buyers also faced high costs in ascertaining the quality and yield of wool, as poor classing in 
many shearing sheds and unscrupulous behaviour by some growers compromised their ability 
to ascertain the quality and weight of wool purchased.  
These problems were gradually resolved by the establishment of a central auction system 
which coordinated and standardized the auction services provided by firms operating in 
Australia’s major ports. It also offered high payoffs to broking firms because wool marketing 
had high fixed costs in terms of warehouse assets. Collective action, if successful, would 
attract more buyers and allow the realization of economies of scale in conducting the auction 
such as a shared salesroom, sale catalogue, and promotional costs. Moreover, participating 
firms could exploit their collective market power by raising prices and limiting non-price 
competition to create rents.8 
The sale of wool shifted from London to Australia after the establishment of a central auction 
system with three-quarters of exports having been sold locally in the first decade of the 
                                                          
7 Barnard, Australian Wool Market, pp. 149-55; Ville, Rural Entrepreneurs Table 6.1, 122-23 
and Table 6.2, p. 126. 
8 Merrett and Ville, Industry associations and non-competitive behaviour, pp. 511-12  
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twentieth century. 9  Buyers negotiated with the newly formed wool selling brokers’ 
associations about the conduct of the auction system, including the movement of wool into 
and out of the stores, the weighing and sampling of bales before auction, the terms of 
payment and dispute resolution all of which reduced uncertainty. 
The central auction system in each of the port cities was therefore organized by wool selling 
brokers’ associations. These bodies were registered as organizations under extant company 
law. However, in purpose and form they were a type of institution. They were designed as 
vehicles for co-ordination amongst firms who anticipated that participation would bring 
greater financial rewards than operating independently. These associations were not 
purposive wealth maximizing organizations in their own right. They were cost centres. The 
associations did not collect the revenue streams associated with wool selling. Contracts were 
signed between the growers and the brokers, and the buyers and the brokers, payment was 
made by clients to the individual broking firms not to the association. Associations had 
limited physical resources, initially renting an auction room, and their operation relied on the 
services of a secretary and a handful of members of the participating broking firms serving in 
a part-time and honorary capacity.  They were accompanied by the emergence of 
associational behaviour among both growers and buyers with the consequence that much of 
the communication and many of the decisions about the development of the wool market 
were taken amongst a web of interacting associations.10 
What type of institution were the wool broking associations? Institutional theorists such as 
North argue that institutions exist to reduce uncertainty by constraining behaviours. 11 In 
Scott’s schema, this end can be achieved by multiple routes. There are three ‘pillars’, around 
which institutions can be formed - regulatory which is rules-based, normative in which 
effectiveness rests on shared values and norms, and cultural-cognitive where ‘shared 
conceptions … constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning 
is made’. 12 Following the lexicon of the field, each pillar has its own mix of elements 
including the basis of compliance and the basis of legitimacy, and ‘carriers’ such as symbolic 
or relational systems, routines and artefacts, which shape how the institution works. To 
complicate matters, institutions can be supported by a combination of pillars and their 
                                                          
9  Ville, Rural Entrepreneurs, Table 6.2, p. 126. 
10  Merrett and Ville. Industry associations and non-competitive behavior variously discusses 
the grower and buyer associations. 
11 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, p. 3. 
12 Scott, Institutions and Organizations, p. 57. 
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associated compliance mechanisms and carriers.13 Following this schema, the wool brokers’ 
associations were primarily regulatory institutions. They were established by institutional 
entrepreneurs in anticipation of commercial gain, actors whose behaviour was rational and 
deliberative. The logic for this action was ‘instrumental’ and those joining did so for 
‘expedience’. This institution employed rules and regulations whose effect was to achieve 
compliance via coercion.14  
The overview by Scott provides a complex and nuanced picture of the construction of 
institutions and the relationship between the three pillars15. The pillars typology is flexible in 
two directions. First, a regulatory institution can also have elements of normative and 
cultural-cognitive foundations, both of which rely on the strength of social obligations and 
shared understandings. Second, the mechanisms or ‘carriers’ which provide support for an 
institution can moderate its nature. For instance, a regulative institution such as a wool 
brokers’ association, which at the point of its establishment relies almost exclusively on 
written rules and regulations, can construct a wider base of strength as it operates. Routines, 
standard operating procedures to do with the movement of wool though the wool stores, 
weighing, cataloguing and so on, and the presence of physical artefacts such as the auction 
room and wool stores, reinforce adherence and compliance to the aims of the institution. 
Time matters because it facilitates experimentation and adaptation. We will argue below that 
the differences between the formal constitutional governance of the institutions between 
cities, and the breakdown of the formal association in Sydney, mattered less than it might 
have because of the evolution of multiple pillars, a subtle shift towards normative and 
cultural-cognitive pillars, and the evolution of standardized custom and practice within and 
between associations.16 
 
INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
                                                          
13 Scott, Institutions and Organizations, Table 3.1 and 4.1, p. 51 and 79. 
14Scott, Institutions and Organizations, Table 3.1, p. 51. 
15 Scott, Institutions and Organizations, Ch. 3. 
16  There is an evolving literature of the history of industry and trade associations but we have 
found none that explicitly addresses Scott’s three-pillar typology.  Our study is also valuable 
in looking at a set of firms who cooperate in some areas of their business but compete in 
others. Recent contributions to the trade association literature, but involving industrial 
districts with far larger numbers of members, include Popp, 'An indissoluble destiny'; 
Carnevali, 'Crooks, thieves and receivers'; Carnevali, 'Social Capital and Trade Associations. 
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Where did the institutions come from? Sydney’s association, the Sydney Wool and Produce 
Salesman’s Association, appeared first in 1889.17 The name was changed to the Sydney 
Wool-Selling Brokers’ Association in September 1892 when it commenced a central 
auction. 18  Melbourne followed almost immediately in March 1890 with the Melbourne 
Woolbrokers’ Association 19 and Brisbane’s Wool Selling Brokers’ Association started in 
1897 [Hereafter SWBA, MWA and BWSBA].20  All had built on earlier foundations. Stock 
and station agents, many of whom became wool brokers, had previously developed co-
operative arrangements concerning auctions among local pastoralists of other farm produce 
and livestock, the latter involving sharing common facilities such as sale yards and 
coordinated sale rosters and the setting of uniform fees. In general, the associations included 
all of the major wool brokers although sometimes a cooperative operated independently. We 
will also see that several Sydney brokers temporarily resigned their membership as 
cooperation eroded for a while at that centre. 
These leading stock and station agents were the institutional entrepreneurs who recognised 
that the wool auction was shifting to Australia and needed a new set of local institutions to 
function effectively. Firms like Goldsbrough Mort [hereafter GM], that were Australian 
based from the beginning, saw this as a good opportunity to build their businesses.  Informal 
understandings were giving way to more elaborate arrangements among the chief firms at 
each major port. For instance, when a group of firms formed the Brisbane Stock and Station 
Agents Association on the 10th of December 1894 this body had a formal constitution and 
comprehensive set of market rules.21 The constitutions of the new wool brokers’ associations’ 
were frequently revised and expanded over the next 20 years in a response to the perceived 
need to constrain the behaviours of their members and to deal with the greater complexity of 
the processes involved in marketing wool.  
 
                                                          
17 For Sydney see Copy of Agreement, 6 August, 1889, New Zealand Loan & Mercantile 
Company, (hereafter NZLM&A), 110/4/313, Noel Butlin Archive Centre (hereafter NBAC). 
18  Sydney Morning Herald, Opening of New Wool Exchange, p. 6. 
19 Merrett, Morgan and Ville, Industry associations as facilitators, p. 783. 
20 BWSBA, OMA 1767/2 Minutes 15 April 1898, John Oxley Library (hereafter JOL). Other 
regional associations included the Adelaide Woolbrokers Association (1894), Launceston 
Woolbrokers Association (1904). Most states had only one selling centre until the middle of 
the nineteenth century. In Victoria the Geelong Woolbrokers Association (1901) was much 
smaller than Melbourne consisting of local firms and a major one, Dalgety. 
21 Brisbane Stock and Station Agents Association, OMA/1767/1 Minutes 10 April 1894, JOL.  
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Table 1 around here 
 
Table 1 is an attempt to capture the formal nature of the institutions in 1909 and to show in 
which respects they diverged. Their constitutions set out a governance structure that defined 
the obligations, rights and privileges of members. These were inclusive in that all member 
firms were part of the committee which, in the words of the Brisbane Association, had 
‘absolute control’ over the ‘entire management of the Association and of all its affairs’22. 
However, the number of votes granted to each member ranged from one each in Melbourne 
to multiple votes related to the sale of wool in the two northern centres, thus giving the larger 
firms in those markets more weight. However, on delicate matters such as fining or expelling 
members, all reverted to one firm, one vote. In both Melbourne and Brisbane, the chair was 
elected from among members at the Annual General Meeting. Sydney stood apart, placing 
itself in the hands of an independent outsider with extraordinary powers to investigate and 
punish breaches of the rules. Both Sydney and Brisbane felt it necessary to bribe members to 
attend committee meetings, or fine those coming late, whereas Melbourne did not.  
The rules of all three associations bound their members to agreement on the nature of the 
work to be carried out in preparing wool for sale and delivery to the buyers, and the fees and 
charges determined by the association. There were minor variations in the rules regarding 
warehouse procedures, most of which were driven by buyers’ requirements for the numbers 
of bales to be sampled for cross-bred and merino wools. However, pricing structures differed 
between centres and within centres over time. From their inception, Melbourne and Brisbane 
used a two-step ‘receiving fee’ linked to the volume of wool handled and a tiered sales 
commission, while Sydney switched backwards and forwards between that and a  single 
composite fee linked to the value of wool sold. Member firms also agreed not to engage in 
non-price competition. Three activities were contentious: firms had offered ‘rebates’ to local 
agents to direct wool into their stores; travellers were employed to canvas business directly 
from growers; and firms advertised via a variety of media such as press notices of sales 
results, gifts and prizes at local shows. 
Achieving agreement on prices and mitigating non-price competition was more easily 
achieved in some centres than others. Each association had a process that facilitated 
                                                          
22 BWSBA OMA/1767/1, Rules, Clause 11, 18 October 1898, JOL.  
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monitoring of the behaviour of member firms. Firms could bring accusations of a breach of 
the rules, such as undercutting the Association's rates or individual advertising, to the 
committee by lodging a complaint with the honorary secretary. The accused could defend 
itself against the charge and the committee would arbitrate. If it was found guilty, the 
miscreant would be fined, or expelled from the association. The latter was a credible threat as 
the firm would forfeit its joining ‘contribution’ of up to £500 and not be allowed access to the 
auction room. The impulse to bring an action was tempered by the need to post a small bond, 
usually £5, which would be forfeited if the accused was found innocent. The procedures by 
which the claims of the accuser and those accused were investigated varied significantly 
between centres. Sydney was the outlier. Once a serious breach had been established, the 
matter passed to the ‘arbitrator’ for adjudication. The arbitrator had the power to call 
witnesses and to examine the documents of the defendant. Brisbane moved some way down 
the same path by being able to employ the services of an external accountant to examine 
more complex cases. 
The effectiveness of the three associations in controlling the actions of their members 
differed widely. In short, Melbourne and Brisbane operated without serious internal discord 
over many decades.23 The Sydney Association, by comparison, was so wracked by dissent 
throughout the 1890s that it lapsed between 1900 and 1909. Sydney brokers squabbled and 
‘cheated’ on agreements covering fees and those limiting non-price competition to such an 
extent that margins and profits were lower than in Melbourne or Brisbane. For instance, 
Australian Mercantile Land and Finance Company [hereafter AMLF] did not expect to earn 
any profit from its wool broking activity when it entered the Sydney market in 1904.24  
The paradox is that the Sydney constitution anticipated this type of behaviour, the result of 
low trust and wavering commitment by members, through its heavy handed rules. We suggest 
that these arrangements reflected a continuing lack of trust between the founding firms in the 
1890s and amongst the enlarged group of firms operating in the 1900s. There may have been 
doubts about the impartiality of any elected chair and the possibility of fears that firms might 
form coalitions to lock in key positions in the Association to the detriment of others. When 
the Association was re‐formed in 1909, the role of Arbitrator was extended from being the 
chair of the association to chairing all meetings of the committee, although he could delegate 
                                                          
23 Ville and Merrett, Inter-organizational communication, pp. 171-9; Merrett, Morgan and 
Ville, Industry associations as facilitators, pp. 73-95.  
24  Bailey, Pastoral Banking, p. 182. 
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but only to another impartial individual. In contrast, Melbourne and Brisbane members 
continued to elect their chair from amongst their own number. Sydney also limited the time 
frame of its association, ranging between three to five years, before the contract would be re-
negotiated. Brisbane followed suit. However, for all its severity, Sydney’s regulatory 
institution failed compared with those in the other cities, insofar as it proved unable to bring 
about cooperation. 
 
Tables 2 & 3 around here 
 
WHY DID INSTITUTIONS DIFFER? 
As shown in Table 2 and 3, a number of wool brokers operated in both Melbourne and 
Sydney, and several also had branches in Brisbane. Why did Melbourne not adopt Sydney’s 
rules, and the late comer Brisbane simply follow what had been adopted in the southern 
capitals?25  Table 1 shows that the constitutions had much in common. However, the lack of 
trust between members in Sydney is reflected in the two outstanding differences between it 
and the associations in Melbourne and Brisbane, the adoption of an independent chair and a 
fixed time period. Even where rules converged over time as a result of conferences attended 
by all the associations, practice continued to differ. We will argue that localized factors 
generated differential levels of trust at the time of association formation and rule framing, and 
that these perceptions became embedded as a form of path dependency. Institutional theorists 
are divided about the longevity of institutional structures 26. Our study suggests that the 
character of the institutions adapted to changing circumstances in what is from an historian’s 
perspective quite a short time frame. Moreover, the process of adaption was multi-faceted. 
While the formal rules of each of the three associations were revised periodically some 
significant differences remained. However, the willingness to cooperate was enhanced by the 
strengthening of the normative and cultural-cognitive aspects of the pillars supporting the 
institution. Convergence occurred more rapidly on these latter two dimensions than on the 
formal rules. 
                                                          
25 The Brisbane brokers obtained copies of the constitution and rules of both the Sydney and 
Melbourne Associations prior to drafting their own. BWSBA OMA/1767/1 Minutes. 29 
August 1894 and 6 December 1894, JOL.   
26 Scott, Institutions and Organizations, pp. 128-32. 
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Following the reasoning of economists and economic historians, we argue that the level of 
commitment by wool brokers to the formal rules of an association, and an acceptance of high 
levels of coercion to enforce conformity, depended on their calculations of the resultant pay 
offs.27 Being a member of an association offered two benefits: a greater number of sellers and 
buyers participating in a centralised auction; and the ability to collude at the expense of 
growers and buyers. The potential size of these benefits and the ability to realize them 
depended on the extent to which other brokers became members. The more universal the 
membership, the greater the likely benefit of being a member and vice versa. Moreover, 
brokers could continue to act as members of the association to receive one rather than both of 
the benefits, to seek increased throughput in the wool store or to seek higher margins by 
raising fees and limiting non-price competition. In either circumstance, some brokers might 
decide that their interests were best served by ‘cheating’ the association. They would weigh 
the likely benefits arising from gaining greater market share by breaking the rules against the 
costs of being punished. Brokers’ decisions to so act would be influenced by the likelihood of 
being caught, an outcome which would depend upon the resources that the association 
devoted to monitoring its members’ actions.   
These same set of considerations impacted on the drafting of the initial constitutions and 
rules. The men who negotiated the establishment of the associations had an intuitive 
understanding of the pay offs and the likely responses of firms operating in the industry. 
Expectations of commitment differed across the three regions, New South Wales, Victoria 
and Queensland, feeding into the three auction centres of Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane in 
the 1890s. The handful of brokers in Melbourne had long cooperated through informal 
arrangements conducted by the Chamber of Commerce, while those in Sydney quarrelled 
throughout the 1880s.28  
Melbourne had lost the title of the ‘principal wool mart of Australia’ to Sydney in the 1880s:  
sheep numbers in the colony grew rapidly, more firms were willing to trade wool, and 
Sydney’s commercial centre and rail communications expanded rapidly.29 However, the core 
group of participants in Melbourne remained unchanged for decades to come. Most of these 
were large scale financiers to the pastoral industry, funding the acquisition of stations, 
                                                          
27  North, Institutions, Institutional Change, p. 15. 
 
28 Barnard, Australian Wool Market, p. 110, note 13 & pp. 154-5. 
29 Franklyn, Glance at Australia in 1880, p. 203. 
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investments in flocks and equipment, and providing working capital as well as acting as 
brokers.30 The bundling of lending and broking services generated strong ‘ties’ with their 
customer base and the firms established strong social capital ties with one another over time31 
Sydney differed in that these ‘financiers’ were not the dominant force in the less concentrated 
broking market in the 1890s or 1900s. Sydney continued to have a larger and more diverse 
group of selling brokers. Comparing Sydney and Melbourne in 1906, there were twice as 
many brokers in Sydney and the market was much less concentrated. The four largest sellers 
were responsible for 49 per cent of the market in Sydney but 78 per cent in Melbourne. 
Calculation of Herfindahl concentration indices confirms that Melbourne was 50-100 per cent 
more concentrated than Sydney.32 Cooperative behavior is easier to achieve in an association 
where there are few and stable members. Trust is stronger, monitoring is less costly, and 
consensus easier to achieve. 
Heterogeneity in Sydney was about business models as well as size. Three types of firms 
each had distinct business models. The national firms (Dalgety. New Zealand Loan & 
Mercantile Agency [hereafter NZLMA], GM and AMLF) had access to long term loan 
facilities with which to buy farmer loyalty, the ability to shift resources between centres as 
required, and London offices to advise them on international market conditions. These were 
all valuable resources, for example, a presence in different markets enabled firms to shift 
resources to Brisbane and Adelaide as their share of national sales increased at the expense of 
Sydney and Melbourne. The larger Sydney-based houses (Winchcombe Carson; Harrison, 
Jones and Devlin; and John Bridge and Co) had reasonable financial backing but lacked the 
geographic flexibility and information flows of the former group. The smaller Sydney houses 
(Hill Clark and Pitt Son and Badgery) lacked all of these levers of competitive advantage and 
instead relied heavily upon social networks and business connections as their main sources of 
strength but competed with farmer cooperatives on this basis.  
Why were the Sydney firms unable to cooperate? We argue that the level of uncertainty 
associated with falling prices and the drought might prompt participants to take a short-term 
view of the industry and their involvement. Paradoxically, the level of charges agreed upon at 
                                                          
30 Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development, ch. 2. 
31  Merrett, Morgan & Ville,  Industry associations as facilitators of social capital 
32 Dalgety Annual Wool Review 
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the Association’s formation provided ample opportunity for ‘cheating’. 33  GM was the 
undisputed market leader when the Association began yet it quickly lost share. Within four 
years, between 1891 and 1894, the share of the market it commanded fell from 26 to thirteen 
per cent.34 There were two possible drivers of such a shift. First, strong prior relationships 
with wool growers possessed by those stock and station agents and financiers entering the 
broking industry could leach share from incumbents.35 Ties between the big pastoral lenders 
and those in their debt were particularly powerful. Second, the impact of the long drought 
was uneven across and within the colonies.36 The supply of wool coming forward by the 
incumbents’ clients was determined by the caprice of nature. However, GM’s internal 
correspondence shows it believed that the loss of custom was directly attributable to breaking 
of the rules by other members of the Association.  In late 1893 the Sydney manager urged his 
superiors to permit him to secede which they eventually did in late December. Thereafter, 
GM set prices independently, arguing that ‘we must be allowed to conduct our internal 
business as suited our conditions’.37  Winchcombe Carson and John Bridge also resigned 
from the Association at this point, and Harrison, Jones and Devlin suggested to GM that the 
Association be dissolved.38  
The Co-operative Wool & Produce Company [hereafter CWP] entered the market in at the 
beginning of the 1896/97 selling season as a direct response to an attempt by the Sydney 
Association to increase charges to parity with those in Melbourne. 39   CWP reached an 
understanding with the buyers to run parallel auctions during its first season of sales. 
However, the buyers boycotted CWP’s sales in August of 1898 in a dispute about the 
imposition of a delivery charge.40 Almost immediately CWP agreed to ‘recommend a large 
                                                          
33  By 1891 the SWSBA had diverged from the Melbourne model of charging the growers a 
receiving fee of ⅛d per pound and a sales commission linked the value of wool sold. From 
1891 growers using the Sydney auction room paid a composite receiving and sales 
commission of 3½% for sales of less than £500 pounds and 3% for larger sales. It was more 
difficult for Sydney firms to observe one another making private arrangements with growers 
to charge lower rates on sales of less than £500 than it was to catch them breaking the non-
price competition rules. NZLMA 110/4/317, SWSBA Agreement, 11 May 1891, NBAC.  
34 Dalgety’s Annual Wool Review 
35 Ville,’Making connections’, pp. 423-48. 
36 Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Tables 1, 2 & 3, pp. 300-05. 
37 GM 2/174/2, letters received Melbourne office, 2 December 1893. NBAC. 
38 GM 2/174/296, letter to Melbourne Manager, 3 January 1895, NBAC. 
39 MWA 79/178, Minutes, 14 January 1896, 21 January 1896, 24 April 1896, 17 July 1896, 
11 December 1896 and 8 January 1897; MWA Annual Report, 6 March 1896, UMA. 
40 Sydney Morning Herald, ‘The Wool Deadlock’, p. 3. 
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reduction in charges for adoption by the [Brokers’] Association’.41 The Sydney manager for 
GM remarked ‘we can see very well that many of the Sydney houses are in such a weak 
condition that they are terrified with the prospect of the Cooperative doing business at rates 
lower than those of the Association and thereafter ready to blindly make any modification 
which falls short of actually adopting the Co-operate tariff’.42 As a consequence, price cutting 
by members of the Association became more prevalent, and in the ensuing free-for-all the 
Association ceased to exist. 43 Despite this retaliation, CWP’s market share rose sharply, 
reaching ten per cent by 1902, before the newcomer’s advantage quickly evaporated as the 
amount of wool it sold fell to six per cent of the total by 1903 and remained thereabouts until 
1909. Sydney broking firms were recidivist; many took the opportunity to attract clients away 
from GM by breaking the Association’s rules in the early 1890s and later on most retaliated 
against CWP.  
We observe different responses to shifts in market share in the other centres. In Melbourne, 
GM suffered a somewhat slower reduction in the share of the market it held, from around 30 
per cent in 1893 to about 20 per cent by 1903, while maintaining this figure until 1909. There 
is no evidence from within the records of GM to suggest that the firm believed this fall from 
grace was the result of cheating by its associates in the MWA. The rise of Younghusband’s 
wool sales compared with the rest occurs from the early 1900s after GM’s position has 
stabilized rather than in the 1890s. The MWA did not suffer from ‘ruinous’ competition 
during its formative years.  
The Brisbane market grew quickly from a low base to overtake Geelong and Adelaide as the 
third largest wool selling centre by WWI.44 Over time, there were large swings in the share 
held by individual firms. Initially, Dalgety was the dominant firm with a share of nearly 60 
per cent. The entry of NZLMA to selling wool in Queensland in 1904 reduced Dalgety’s 
share by more than a third within a year. However, NZLMA’s share levelled off quickly 
without a hint of retaliation by price cutting or non-price competition. It is possible that the 
great savings in overheads in Brisbane, resulting from sharing warehouse premises in a leased 
building, lessened the need especially amongst the smaller firms to cheat to maintain volume. 
The brief drop in Dalgety’s market share was not threatening to the firm which was emerging 
                                                          
41 GM, 2/28A (3) letter to London, 14 September 1898, NBAC.  
42 GM, 2/28A (3) letter to London 14 September 1898, NBAC. 
43 NZLMA, 110/4/319 letter to manager, 21 March 1900, NBAC. 
44 Bureau of Agriculture Economics, Statistical Handbook, Table 1, 1. 
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as the giant of the industry, 45  and NZLMA, a recent newcomer to wool broking, had 
sufficient resources to ride out any temporary swings in share.   
Melbourne also provided fertile ground for the creation of a strong institution. Priors 
mattered. There was a long history of cooperation amongst the small number of firms which 
became members of the association.  As shown in Table 2, the industry structure was 
relatively stable with Younghusband and Co being the only new entrant in the years 
immediately prior to the formation of the association. The competitive impact of this firm 
was muted as it reached out into the Riverina district of southern New South Wales from its 
base in Albury rather than competing head on for Victorian wools.46 Another three new firms 
entered and left within the space of a few years, Victorian Farmers Loan, National Wool 
Trading Co and Co-operative Wool & Produce,47 without making much of a mark. Two of 
the strugglers, Union Mortgage & Agency [hereafter UMA] and Australasian Mortgage & 
Agency, were absorbed by Australian Estates and AMLF respectively in 1899 and 1904. In a 
relatively settled environment, the MWA’s constitution underpinned collegial decision 
making. While members monitored the actions of their peers, transgressions were infrequent 
and the modest enforcement procedures were seldom used. Substantial amounts of social 
capital underpinned the smooth workings of the association.48  
The Association in Brisbane was formed in special circumstances that favoured co‐operation. 
Queensland wool had left the colony on consignment for sale overseas or found its way into 
sales rooms in Sydney and Melbourne. Four stock and station agents, Moreheads, 
MacTaggart Bros, UMA, and Fenwick, had formed the Brisbane Stock and Station Agents 
Association in December 1894 to collaborate on livestock sales. Earlier in the year ‘a 
desultory conversation took place with reference to the establishment of wool sales, but no 
resolution was come to’.49 However, within a few years these same firms made a concerted 
effort to begin a local wool market. They needed to work cooperatively to build the necessary 
infrastructure. Under the energetic leadership of John Leahy, the local director of UMA and a 
                                                          
45 Hartwell, Dalgety, typescript, chapter 9, 12-13.  
46  Were’s Statistical Service. Younghusband & Co. 
47 The CWP, which operated in Victoria, was a separate entity to the one in New South 
Wales, although the firms shared some directors. Unlike its northern counterpart, the 
Victorian CWP cooperated with the MWA. Sydney Morning Herald, ‘The wool deadlock’, p. 
3. The Victorian CWP was sold to Younghusband in 1901. Argus, 25 March 1901, p. 4. 
48 Ville and Merrett, Investing in inter-organizational; Merrett, Morgan and Ville, Industry 
associations as facilitators, pp.73-95. 
49 BWSBA, OMA 1767/1  Minutes, 9 March 1894, JOL,  
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member of parliament 50 , they lobbied the colonial government on a range of matters: 
subsidies, relief from export taxes, and reductions in railway freights.51 The members of the 
renamed association, the Brisbane Wool Selling Brokers’ Association, shared premises in 
which their wool was stored and viewed by the buyers before auction. An annexe of the 
government’s Exhibition Building was used for the purpose for many years. The Association 
negotiated hard with its landlord winning numerous improvements to the site including, 
better lighting, wider doors to facilitate the movement of bales in and out, and the 
construction of a rail siding.52 The small number of members meant that there was greater 
involvement in the planning and operation of the market than happened in Sydney or 
Melbourne where participants built their own wool stores. 
 
PAYOFFS  
Brokers operated in an environment of considerable uncertainty about the future of the 
industry, which clouded the estimation of pay offs. It was far from certain in the 1890s that 
Australian sales would replace the consignment system. Dalgety, for instance, consigned 
more wool than it sold locally until 1901. 53 Firms had to decide whether to commit to 
investing in wool stores that might become white elephants in unpropitious circumstances. A 
severe drought from 1896 until 1902 reduced sheep numbers in New South Wales by 56 per 
cent, by 68 per cent in Queensland and 23 per cent in Victoria.54 Falling wool prices from the 
late 1880s until the mid-1890s,55 added to the woes. Moreover, the Sydney market faced 
competition from Melbourne and later from Brisbane for New South Wales wool grown near 
the boundaries of those colonies/states as brokers sought to divert this wool into their sales 
                                                          
50 Waterson, Biographical Register, pp. 105-6. 
51 BWSBA OMA 1767/1 minutes. 20 July 1897, 27 April 1898, and 12 July 1898. JOL.  
52BWSBA OMA 1767/2 minutes. 14 November 1898, 20 February 1899, 31 July 1899, 9 
September 1901 and 28 March 1903, JOL. 
53 Hartwell, Dalgety, chapter 9, p. 11. 
54 Bureau of Agriculture Economics, Statistical Handbook, Table 1, p. 1. 
55  Wool prices halved between 1884 and 1894. Official Year Book of New South Wales 1904-
5, p. 728.  
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rooms. 56  Butlin, for instance, estimates that a third of New South Wales wool was shipped 
into Victoria in the last third of the nineteenth century.57  
In an environment with high levels of uncertainty about the future of wool broking and with 
firms making various degrees of commitment to this side of their business we might 
anticipate that firms, particularly those with pessimistic expectations, would take a short-term 
view of the pay offs. The uncertainty was augmented by Sydney having a larger number of 
brokers there than in either Melbourne or Brisbane, with a past history of non-cooperation, 
who scrambled for market share. Game theory suggests there is a heightened tendency for 
players to ‘cheat’ in what they expect to be the last round of the game as they can escape 
retaliation.58 Consequently, Sydney firms would be more likely to ‘cheat’ than in Melbourne 
or Brisbane because they anticipated withdrawing from wool broking and/or that the 
Association would collapse so removing the opportunity to ‘cheat’ against the agreed charges 
and arrangements relating to non-price competition.  
Sydney-based broking firms discriminated between pay-offs involved from operating a 
central sale room and from agreements about rents. Payoffs from the operation of a central 
auction room arose from the increased volume of wool handled in an industry with high fixed 
costs. While firms ‘cheated’ on price to such an extent that the formal Association fell into 
abeyance, the bargains relating to the auction system continued to be honoured in full.59 
Members continued to operate as a shadow organization by achieving coordination in 
conducting regular auctions in Sydney, negotiating with buyers’ associations, and integrating 
its sale calendar with those of Brisbane and Melbourne. While Sydney firms were prepared to 
strike out on their own with regard to price, none attempted to operate independently in 
selling wool. We would suggest that the impulse to cooperate comes from a calculation of the 
benefits arising from participating in the central auction system and of the costs of operating 
                                                          
56 For instance, the BWSBA advertised in local newspapers highlighting the government 
bonus of £1 per ton of wool sold at the Brisbane auctions. The Queenslander, 24 December 
1898, p. 1. 
57 Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development, p. 307. 
58 Dixit and Nalebuff, Art of Strategy; Oster, Modern Competitive Analysis, ch. 13. 
59 A new association, the Wool Selling Institute, replaced the SWSBA during 1901. It 
welcomed the participation of non-member broking firms in the auction rooms provided they 
were ‘prepared to work on the same lines as those we have resolved on...’ NZLMA, 
110/4/319 Correspondence re new association, Undated. NBAC 
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outside. It was the buyers rather than the brokers’ association who held the whip hand as the 
buyers in all states forbade their members to deal with non-association brokers.60  
The Sydney Association placed greater reliance on coercive mechanisms to bond its members 
yet it was weakened by endemic ‘cheating’. We argued above that brokers operating in 
Sydney through the 1890s and early 1900s faced the greatest amount of uncertainty about the 
future of this emergent industry and the greatest environmental stress. In this atmosphere, 
many firms calculated that the pursuit of self-interest favoured independent action with 
respect to issues of pricing their services and to attracting wool into their stores by using 
travellers and advertising to attract custom. In the end, the individualistic behaviour had cost 
everyone dear as margins were competed away. Those firms who recognised what had been 
lost harboured resentments against those who had abandoned the Association’s agreements so 
lightly while thumbing their noses at their peers. Such behaviours gave rise to continued ill 
feeling. GM’s chairman commented in July 1904 that he was ‘rather pleased that they 
[AMLF] are taking the place of the AMA&Co as it may lead to better conditions in 
Sydney’.61 Old attitudes died hard. Even after the re-formation of the SWSBA, the NZLMA 
manager complained that ‘the [Association] meeting was a discursive one, unduly prolonged 
by the mock heroics of Mr Lionel Bridge and the spontaneous enthusiasm of Mr Robert Pitt.’ 
Discussion of the draft allowance given to buyers dragged on without resolution, prompting 
the sarcastic comment that ‘the discussion, or rather altercation, on this subject would have 
been prolonged indefinitely if time had allowed.62  
For all the residual tensions and bickering mentioned above, the day to day operation of a 
central auction room in Sydney strengthened the institution over time. The rules and 
regulations adopted by the Association at the time of its reformation in 1909 were still 
tougher than those governing the associations in Melbourne and Brisbane. In our view, the 
growing levels of trust between wool brokers in Sydney mattered more in strengthening that 
institution than a reframing of the constitution. Individuals representing firms were drawn 
into regular face to face contact participating in the annual series of wool sales over the 
previous 17 years. Many of the managers representing firms in the three selling centres held 
                                                          
60 See Victorian Wool Buyers’ Association, Constitution and Rules, 1921, clause 35, UMA, 
Accession 106/121, Series 22/3/1, Box 44. 
61 GM, Niall to Casey, 12 July 1904, Barnard Papers, Series 2/91, RGC Papers – box 2, 
London visit 1904, NBAC Deposit ANUA 377. 
62 NZLMA 11/4/340, memo to Mr Graham, 16 March 1910, NBAC. 
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those posts for decades.63 Moreover, members of the Associations regularly travelled 600 
miles together by train and ship to attend conferences with brokers in other cities. Friendships 
were formed and common interests identified that created a pool of social capital that salved 
remaining frictions.64  
Changes in behaviour among Sydney brokers was driven by a combination of internal and 
external pressures. Years of intense competition to protect or gain market share at the 
expense of their colleagues had driven margins to near competitive levels. Sydney brokers 
had the example of members of associations in Melbourne and Brisbane generating and 
enjoying rents. 65  The pay offs from coordination could be increased by co-operation. 
Moreover, the associations in other markets were growing concerned that the lower level of 
charges levied on both growers and particularly buyers in Sydney were used as a bargaining 
chip to reduce them elsewhere.66 Coordination between associations became an imperative to 
protect the rents being earned by wool brokers across Australia. Over time a number of the 
major wool brokers were engaged in multiple selling centres. By so doing each gained first-
hand experience of the differences in rents being earned at various locations, and this 
information possibly stimulated the reconstitution of the Sydney Association in 1909.  
  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We have employed the three pillars schema to explore the forces which shaped the 
establishment and evolution of the institution governing the wool auction system. In doing so, 
we offer some fresh insights into the institution theory literature. Each of the pillars draws on 
a distinct social science discipline. Economists and economic historians rely upon the 
regulatory interpretation, sociologists employ the normative pillar, and cultural 
anthropologists work within the cultural-cognitive pillar.67 Researchers from each discipline 
might be expected to approach the problem through their own lens. The literature offers few 
clues as to how the pillars may work together or how their inter-relationship alters over time.  
                                                          
63 For Dalgety see Hartwell [nd], chapter 8, 5-6 & 10; GM had two Sydney managers, G 
Maiden and E J E McKenzie, between 1899 and 1914, see entries in Nash, Australasian 
Joint-Stock Companies ,1899 and1914 
64 Merrett, Morgan and Ville, Industry associations as facilitators, pp. 73-95. 
65 We know of no direct evidence of rates of return from wool broking for any firm in any 
market during this period.  
66 Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, 20 October 1908, p. 845. 
67 Scott, Institutions and Organizations. 
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Our study, contextualized by an institution to serve a particular purpose and located in a 
unique time and location, provides an illustration of how the game plays out. The wool 
brokers’ associations are best understood initially through the use of a regulatory pillar 
framework. This study of a micro-institution concerns the actions of business people 
undertaking high stakes investment in a central wool auction. The participants were known to 
one another through prior dealings, some collaborative such as conducting live stock 
auctions, while others were competitive, particularly mortgage lending. However, these 
interactions were unlikely to have had sufficient breadth or time to build strong normative or 
cultural-cognitive pillars. The participants were predisposed to codify agreements. Local 
Chambers of Commerce had long been arbiters of commercial practice. Business was 
conducted in a country using British commercial law that facilitated contract enforcement.  
Paradoxically, the strength of a market-based regulatory system gave the participants within 
the wool brokers’ association greater scope for agency. The wider ‘rules of the game’ as 
defined by North68 encouraged firms to follow their own path confident that their private 
rights were secure within the scope of the law. Consequently, the broader rules of the game 
legitimized defection from associational agreements as the pursuit of self interest was 
permissible. Firms made rational calculations about the benefits and costs from abiding by 
the rules or cheating. We suggest that localized environmental forces shaped how wool 
broking firms acted. The severe drought and falling wool prices hit the firms operating in the 
Sydney market harder than those in Melbourne and Brisbane. Uncertainty was greater 
amongst Sydney firms because there were more competitors operating there. In these 
circumstances, many of the Sydney firms felt that their best choice was to cheat on industry 
agreements with respect to receiving and delivery charges, sales commissions, and non-price 
competition. 
We have argued above that the increasing strength of the institution in Sydney relied on more 
than a regulatory pillar. Indeed, that pillar was ineffective as ‘cheating’ was rampant and 
punishment almost non-existent. Despite this, the Association persisted with much the same 
form of a highly legalistic and draconian monitoring system in its rules upon re-forming in 
1909. The firms in Sydney bonded together for a number of reasons. The end of the drought 
around 1902 and rising wool prices up to and during World War One brought prosperity to 
the wool industry in which the brokers shared. More importantly, the repetitive and 
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interactive cycle of the auctioning of wool forged a sense of collective identity amongst 
brokers. Cooperation and squabbles existed side by side. Cooperation coalesced around 
shared routines in inter-firm communication and negotiation about sale dates, orders of sale, 
printing catalogues and dealing with buyers, wool scourers, port authorities and the railways 
commissioners. The emergence of custom and practice strengthen a normative pillar which 
compensated for the fragility of its regulative cousin. Australia rode to economic recovery 
and to post-Federation nationhood on the sheep’s back. Wool had a special place in the 
national psyche. It was widely represented in popular culture and media. Leading pastoralists 
and stud masters were national identities. 69  The great pastoral companies were national 
leaders.70 Being seen as part of the wool industry gave legitimacy to the firms involved. 
These developments nourished yet another pillar, the cultural-cognitive. 
The rise of normative and cultural-cognitive pillars notwithstanding, the re-formation of the 
Sydney association relied heavily on the rational calculus of its members. Fierce competition 
within Sydney for market share had driven profits down. Sydney brokers were aware that 
members of the Melbourne and Brisbane associations were generating higher margins as a 
result of their agreements. This knowledge was transmitted to them by Sydney firms which 
also operated in the other markets. Eventually, Sydney brokers accepted the same levels of 
prices and restrictions on non-price competition as in the other centres and abided by them. 
Sydney brokers recognized that they needed to reform their association to interact with the 
buyers and the other associations. The transfer from consignment to local auction was largely 
complete. The growth of a mass market required coordination on a national scale. Sydney, 
the largest market, could not afford to remain aloof. The wheel had turned full circle as 
Sydney, which had first proposed a unified body, the Associated Brokers of Melbourne and 
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Table 1: Institution agreements, monitoring processes and penalties, c.1909 
 Melbourne Sydney  Brisbane 
Governance All members on 
committee 
All members on 
committee 
All members on 
committee 




Chair elected At AGM No  At AGM 




Payment for committee work No Yes  Fined for lateness 










Agree to impose 
Change over time 
Agree to impose 
Change over 
time 
Agree to impose 
Change over time  
Rebates Agree to limit Agree to limit Agree to limit 
Travellers Agree to limit 
poaching by rivals 





Agree to limit 
poaching by 
rivals  
Advertising Agree to forgo Agree to forgo Agree to forgo 
Monitoring By members  but 
reduce vexatious 
claims 
By members  
mandatory 
Duty of members 
to report breach 
Disciplinary action taken by  Vote by members Two step 
process: Serious 
breach dealt 






in serious matters 
26 
 








Joining fee/Bond  £100 and £500 
‘contribution’ 
£500 £100 and £100 
‘contribution’ 




Source: NZLMA, Sydney Wool and Produce; NZLMA , Rules and Regulations, 
NBAC Deposit 110/4/340; University of Melbourne Archives, Accession 196/121/, 
and Brisbane Wool Selling Brokers Association, Rules and Regulations, October 




Table 2: Original members of associations in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane 
 
Sydney 1889 Melbourne 1893 Brisbane 1898 
Australasian Mortgage & 
Agency [1863] [F] 
Australasian Mortgage & 
Agency  [F] 
 
Dalgety [1884] [F] Dalgety [F] Dalgety [F] 
NZLMA [1865] [F] NZLMA [F] NZLMA [F] 
Goldsbrough Mort [1881, 
absorb Mort 1888] [F] 
Goldsbrough Mort [F]  
 Union Mortgage & Agency 
[1884] [F] 
Union Mortgage  & 
Agency [F] 
Harrison, Jones & Devlin 
[1882] 
Younghusband & Co 
[1889] 
Moreheads [1899] 
Hill, Clark [1909]  Thomas Noyes 
J H Geddes – absorbed by 
PSA 1891 
 Fenwick [1864] 







Wyly, Trenchard     
 
Notes: Date of company registration is denoted by [1863]; otherwise a partnership. [F] 
denotes financier.  





Table 3: New entrants to associations before 1909 
 
Sydney Melbourne  Brisbane 
Pitt, Son & Badgery [1888] 
(1898) 
  
 Australian Estates acquire 
UMA in 1899 [F] 
Australian Estates acquire 
UMA in 1899 [F] 
Schute Bell [1901] (1909) Victorian Farmers Loan 
(1894-97) 
McTaggart Bros [1886] 
(1899) 
 National Wool Trading 
Co. (1894-97) 
Sturmfels [1907] (c1907) 
 
 Co-operative Wool & 
Produce (1898-1901) 
 




AM&A in1904] [F] 
AML&F absorbs AM&A 
in 1904 [F] 
 
 
Notes: Date of establishment as a company is denoted by [1888] and date of joining an 
association is shown by (1898). A range of dates is given when year of first membership is 
unknown. [F] denotes financier. 
Source: As for Table 1 and Nash, Australasian Joint-Stock Companies, various. 
 
 
 
